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COMMENTS
WHEN LEVIATHAN SPEAKS: REINING IN
THE GOVERNMENT-SPEECH DOCTRINE
THROUGH A NEW AND RESTRICTIVE
APPROACH
CARL G. DENIGRIS
If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood
and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education,
the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. . . .
Such, in my opinion, is the command of the Constitution.
—Justice Louis Brandeis1
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INTRODUCTION
Government speaks. From the spoken word of the Presidential podium2
to the written messages more subtly conveyed through state mottos,3 the
government‘s voice is everywhere.4 In a republican democracy, the idea
that the government needs to be able to establish and maintain its own

2. The presidential press conference is one clear example of the executive branch
expressly conveying its messages and views, usually through policy statements, to the
general public. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech is Both
Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 628 (2008) (observing that a ―White
House spokesperson‘s announcement of the administration‘s policy at a press conference‖ is
a clear example of government speech).
3. Symbols and mottos adopted by governments and placed on government property—
such as license plates or the national currency—are used to convey the values and themes
that the government wishes to express. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716–
17 (1977) (recognizing that New Hampshire‘s purpose in placing its motto on state license
plates was to disseminate the state‘s ideology); Paul Kulwinski, Note, Trust In God Going
Too Far: Indiana’s “In God We Trust” License Plate Endorses Religion At Taxpayer
Expense, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1317, 1317–18 nn.4–5 (2009) (describing how the motto ―In
God We Trust‖ was placed on United States currency partly in response to religious fervor
during the Civil War and how the decision to adopt this phrase as the official motto of the
United States was ―heavily influenced‖ by the Cold War and the ―conflicting views on
human morality that the United States and the Soviet Union held‖).
4. See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who’s Talking? Disentangling Government and Private
Speech, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 35, 40 (2002) (―Government speech occurs when officials
and entities at the local, state, and federal level communicate in myriad ways with their
constituents, among themselves, or with foreign entities.‖).
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voice is almost axiomatic.5 This is because a healthy democracy depends
on the government‘s ability to transmit substantive messages about its
policies and actions to the public that will eventually hold it accountable.6
Accountability requires, then, that the voice of the government be clear and
unmistakably its own.7 Otherwise, a government‘s message may be
distorted by, or confused with, private viewpoints.8
This is the essential premise of the ―recently minted‖9 governmentspeech doctrine: ―when the government speaks for itself, it ‗may take
legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither
garbled nor distorted.‘‖10 Government as a speaker, therefore, is not
subjected to the same First Amendment limitations that government as a

5. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government
Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1380 (2001) (noting that representative democracies are a
―two-way affair‖ in which the government must explain, persuade and justify its policies
and preferences); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech and the Falsification of Consent, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1747 (1983) (reviewing MARK YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS:
POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983)) (―The democratic
process necessarily involves a dialogue, or at least an interchange, between government and
citizen.‖).
6. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235
(2000) (observing that ―[w]hen the government speaks‖ in order to ―promote its own
policies‖ and ideas ―it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate‖ for these ideas); see also
Mary Jean Dolan, The Special Public Purpose Forum and Endorsement Relationships: New
Extensions of Government Speech, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 125 (2004) (explaining
that the government‘s right to express a certain message ―is based on the reality that
governments are elected to promote certain values, often to the exclusion of others‖); Helen
Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 587, 590 (2008) (―Government speech . . . furthers citizens‘ capacities to participate in
democratic self-governance by enabling them to . . . learn and evaluate the views of their
elected representatives.‖).
7. See Norton, supra note 6, at 591 (observing that the public can hold its elected
officials accountable for their views and expressions ―only when it actually understands the
contested expressions as the government‘s‖). Although the second prong of the two-prong
government-speech test proposed by Professor Norton looks to whether ―onlookers
understand that expression to be the government‘s at the time of its delivery‖—what she
calls establishing the source of a message ―functionally‖—her test is different from the one
proposed in this Comment because the ―formal‖ part of her analysis (which is given equal
weight) looks to whether the government explicitly claims speech as its own. Id. at 632.
While such official acknowledgment of speech would certainly factor into the reasonableobserver test proposed in this Comment, should the observers be aware that the government
had claimed the speech as its own, this factor is not an independent prong of the test
proposed in Part III. See infra Part III.A.
8. See Norton, supra note 6 at 632 (acknowledging the effects that the misattribution
of private views has on government speech and public debate).
9. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see also Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass‘n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (―The government-speech doctrine is relatively new, and correspondingly
imprecise.‖).
10. Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Planned
Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 792 (4th Cir. 2004)); accord Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
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regulator of private speech must contend with.11 This means that a
government-speech defense grants the government a far greater ability to
regulate its own message by preferring certain viewpoints to others when it
is determined to be the speaker than it does when a private party is
speaking in a public forum.12
However, the distinction between
government speech and private speech is not as clear as it may seem,13 and
granting the government extensive speech powers could have a devastating
effect on private speech rights.14 Furthermore, allowing the government
free range to control any speech it claims is its own ―may threaten [the
democratic] processes of consent through indoctrination and the
withholding of vital information.‖15 Thus, extensive government-speech
power could distort the ―marketplace of ideas‖ that the First Amendment
was designed to protect.16
11. See, e.g., Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 (―The Free Speech Clause restricts
government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech.‖);
Johanns, 544 U.S. at 553 (―[T]he Government‘s own speech . . . is exempt from First
Amendment scrutiny.‖); Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech:
Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech To Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J.
1, 22 (2009) (―Because government speech is so important to a thriving democracy, the
constitutional standards for evaluating government‘s control of its own speech differ
dramatically from those that apply to the government‘s regulation of private expression.‖).
While the government may not be subjected to the same First Amendment restrictions when
it is the speaker, such as the Free Speech Clause‘s limitations against viewpoint
discrimination, this does not mean that it is completely unrestrained by the First
Amendment. Id. at 24 (recognizing that limits may be placed on government speech by
constitutional constraints other than the Free Speech Clause). For example, the First
Amendment‘s Establishment Clause would certainly prohibit any government entity from
espousing a message that clearly supports one religion or religious sect to the exclusion of
others. See id. (―[G]overnment expression that endorses religion may violate the
Establishment Clause.‖); infra note 112 and accompanying text (recognizing the limits
placed on government speech by the Establishment Clause).
12. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 (claiming that the government has ―the right to
‗speak for itself‘‖ and to subsequently exclude from its own speech any views that it
disagrees with); accord David L. Hudson Jr., Government Speech Doctrine, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 528, 528 (John R. Vile et al. eds., 2009)
(observing that the government ―has its own rights as speaker‖ and is ―immune from free
speech challenges‖ under the government-speech doctrine).
13. See Norton, supra note 6, at 590 (acknowledging that it ―is not always easy‖ to
distinguish between governmental and private speech and that courts have ―struggle[d] with
the challenge of parsing government expression from private expression‖); Hudson, supra
note 12 (observing that ―[m]uch difficulty exists‖ in distinguishing governmental from
private speech and citing the lower courts division in the specialty license plate line of cases
as an example).
14. See Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government
Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 863, 897 (1980) (―The passage of
time since adoption of the Bill of Rights has revealed that laws and practices that permit
massive government communications activities may as effectively silence private speakers
as a direct regime of censorship.‖).
15. Id. at 898.
16. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 5, at 1505 (recognizing that extensive
government speech powers could negatively affect the speech marketplace by ―threaten[ing]
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Over the last three decades, the role of government speech in the
American constitutional system has gone from being discussed through
mere scholarly speculation to an express doctrine in First Amendment
jurisprudence.17 While the Supreme Court has laid out the broad contours
of the doctrine, it has provided little—and often conflicting—insight into
how courts should distinguish between what is government speech and
what is private speech.18 Without much guidance by the Court, the circuit
courts‘ attempts at fashioning a functioning government-speech test have
led to inconsistent results, which are most evident in the context of
specialty license plates.19 The Court passed up an opportunity to establish
a uniform and effective government-speech test when it recently, and ―[f]or
at least the fifth time,‖20 denied certiorari to a case involving the
controversial ―Choose Life‖ specialty license plates.21

the rule that the dissemination of speech in the market is governed by private decisions, not
public imperative‖). See generally ROBERT L. TSAI, ELOQUENCE & REASON: CREATING A
FIRST AMENDMENT CULTURE 60–68 (2008) (discussing the ―marketplace of ideas‖ metaphor
in First Amendment theory).
17. Compare Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134–35 (recognizing and applying the
government-speech doctrine), and Bezanson & Buss, supra note 5, at 1509–11 (analyzing
and critiquing the government-speech doctrine), with Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech,
27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 569–70 (1980) (recognizing that prior to the 1980s free speech
theory ―had little to say about the process by which the government‖ speaks), and Yudof,
supra note 14, at 906 (arguing that ―[d]irect judicial action is probably not the best way to
limit the impact of government speech‖).
18. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass‘n, 544 U.S 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the few cases in which the Court had addressed the governmentspeech doctrine had ―not gone much beyond . . . broad observations‖); Norton, supra note
11, at 26 (―[T]he Supreme Court has yet to announce a definitive test for identifying
government speech . . . .‖); Lilia Lim, Comment, Four-Factor Disaster: Courts Should
Abandon the Circuit Test For Distinguishing Government Speech From Private Speech, 83
WASH. L. REV. 569, 570–71 (2008) (noting that the Supreme Court ―has not clearly
explained how to tell‖ government from private speech, and arguing that the four-factor
circuit court test should be abandoned but not proposing an alternative test). Compare
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542–43 (2001) (finding that the government
could not control the message of attorneys funded through the government-run Legal
Services Corporation because their message constituted private speech), with Johanns, 544
U.S. at 560 (finding that a promotional campaign funded by taxes targeted towards beef
producers constituted government speech because the government ―effectively controlled‖
the message).
19. See infra notes 161–65 (describing the inconsistent results of the circuit courts‘
government-speech tests).
20. Adam Liptak, Justices Decline to Hear Some 2,000 Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,
2009, at A19 (noting that by refusing to hear a ―Choose Life‖ license plate case, the Court
refrained from ―taking sides in the abortion debate‖).
21. Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
59 (2009). ―Choose Life‖ specialty license plates were initially created with the dual
intentions of ―encourag[ing] adoption and rais[ing] funds for organizations that discourage
abortions.‖ Traci Daffer, Comment, A License To Choose or a Plate-Ful of Controversy?
Analysis of the “Choose Life” Plate Debate, 75 UMKC L. REV. 869, 871–72 (2007). Since
the first ―Choose Life‖ plate was issued by Florida in 1999, the plates have been the cause
of litigation across the country. See generally id. at 871–78 (discussing the history of
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This Comment will argue that current government-speech tests lead to
inconsistent results, do not sufficiently focus on the concerns that led to the
creation of the government-speech doctrine and, most importantly, do not
ensure political accountability and provide adequate safeguards for private
speech rights. It will propose that the Supreme Court refine its
government-speech doctrine by establishing a reasonable-observer test
similar to the endorsement test used in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence22
and
identical
to
the
test
used
by Justice Souter in his recent concurrence in Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum.23 It will further propose that courts guard against
inappropriate use of the government-speech defense by assessing certain
factors before permitting the government to use the defense. Part I will
examine the history of the government-speech doctrine as it arose through
key Supreme Court cases and how it has been applied by the circuit courts
in the specialty license plate cases. Part II will analyze the current tests
used to determine whether certain contested speech is governmental or
private and the effectiveness and consistency of these tests. After showing
that these current tests lead to inconsistent results and unnecessarily
infringe on private speech rights, Part III will propose a stricter and more
focused reasonable-observer test that will better ensure political
accountability. Furthermore, Part III concludes that inquiries into both the
interests involved and whether there are less intrusive means to protect
governmental interests are necessary to protect First Amendment speech
rights from abuse flowing from the government-speech defense.

―Choose Life‖ plates). The plates are most commonly challenged by pro-choice advocates
on the basis that states unconstitutionally discriminate against a viewpoint when they open
up the license plate forum to the pro-life, and not the pro-choice, viewpoint. See id. at 870–
71 (―Opponents of the plate program have argued the government‘s issuance of such plates
violates freedom of expression by supporting only one side of the abortion debate.‖); see
also Brielle C. Goldfaden, Comment, “Choose Life” Plates: The States’ License to
Discriminate Based on Viewpoint, 5 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 279, 282 (2008) (―In the
‗Choose Life‘ cases, the plaintiffs have argued that because they were denied the issuance of
license plates expressing their ideology, the government discriminatorily regulates private
speech by only permitting the pro-life message to be disseminated, filtering out the prochoice view.‖).
22. See infra Part II.C (describing the endorsement test).
23. 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1142 (2009).
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BACKGROUND

A. From Wooley to Summum: The Evolution of the Supreme Court’s
“Newly Minted” Government-Speech Doctrine
The idea that governments speak is not a new concept,24 but it was not
until the late seventies and early eighties that constitutional scholars began
to seriously analyze the effects of such speech on other First Amendment
doctrines.25 The Supreme Court itself did not explicitly acknowledge the
distinction between government and private speech until 1990,26 but the
notion that the government has certain speech powers could have been
inferred as far back as the decision in Wooley v. Maynard.27 In Wooley, the
Supreme Court held that the State of New Hampshire could not force an
individual to ―becom[e] the courier for‖ the state‘s own message (in this
case, the state‘s motto, ―Live Free or Die‖) if the individual found the
message objectionable.28 The implication of the Court‘s holding is that
24. See Shiffrin, supra note 17, at 566 n.3 (observing that one of the concerns for
nineteenth century philosopher John Stuart Mill when writing his seminal work,
On Liberty, was ―the danger of government speech‖).
25. See generally Shiffrin, supra note 17, at 655 (arguing that certain limits must be
placed on government speech in order to prevent ―major and unacceptable incursions on
liberty‖); Yudof, supra note 14 (analyzing government speech in the context of the First
Amendment).
26. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (explaining the ―crucial
difference‖ between government speech that endorses religion and private speech that
endorses religion). It is important to note that First Amendment jurisprudence has often
distinguished between what it has termed ―private‖ and ―public‖ speech
in the context of private speakers. See JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 804–11 (10th ed. 2006) (recognizing the Supreme Court‘s
distinction between ―private‖ and ―public‖ speech, and explaining that the difference
depends on the speech‘s content, form, and context). That is, the Supreme Court has found
that the First Amendment places a greater value on speech involving issues of public
concern than it does on speech involving issues that are purely a private matter. See Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985) (―It is speech on
‗matters of public concern‘ that is ‗at the heart of the First Amendment‘s protection.‘ . . . In
contrast, speech on matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern.‖).
In the context of this Comment, however, private speech refers to speech that is attributable
to
a
private actor, while government—or governmental—speech refers to speech that is
attributable to the state. Thus, the distinction between private and public speech focuses on
the content of private actors‘ speech, while the private/governmental distinction focuses on
the identity of the speech actor. Compare id. at 762 (finding the content of a credit report to
be ―private‖ speech and not speech addressing a matter of public concern), with Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129 (2009) (finding the placement of privately
funded monuments in a public park to be a form of government, and not private, speech).
27. See 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (acknowledging that New Hampshire‘s interest in
requiring its state motto be displayed on license plates was to ―communicate to others an
official view as to proper appreciation of history, state pride and individualism‖).
28. See id. at 707, 717 (holding that ―the State‘s interest‖ in ―disseminat[ing] an
ideology‖ did not ―outweigh an individual‘s First Amendment right‖ in disassociating
themselves from the state‘s message).
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while the state cannot force a private individual to endorse or promote its
message, a state may maintain and promote its own viewpoints in a manner
that does not compel individuals to be spokespeople for such a message.29
Fourteen years after Wooley recognized an association between license
plates and speech interests, the Supreme Court laid down the foundations
of what would become its government-speech doctrine.30 In Rust v.
Sullivan,31 the Court was asked to decide whether certain regulations
promulgated under Title X of the Public Health Service Act32 violated the
First Amendment.33 A group of Title X-funded doctors challenged, among
others, a regulation prohibiting them from counseling patients about
abortion, claiming that such restrictions violated their free speech rights.34
In
a
5-4
decision,
the Court upheld the regulations on the grounds that ―the Government . . .
ha[d] merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other‖ and
had not, therefore, unconstitutionally violated the doctors‘ private speech
rights.35 The Court held that the government does not unconstitutionally
engage in viewpoint discrimination where it ―selectively fund[s] a program
[that] it believes to be in the public interest.‖36 While the phrase
―government speech‖ is never mentioned in the opinion, in later cases the

29. See id. (noting that ―the State may legitimately pursue [its] interests‖ of
―communicat[ing] to others‖ the views it hoped to express through its state motto ―in any
number of ways‖). While Wooley explicitly dealt with the question of whether the state
could compel an individual to be a courier of its message, implicit in this inquiry was the
notion that the state does have a message of its own and the power to promote that message.
Id. Also implicit in this analysis is that there is a significant distinction between government
and private speech. Id.
30. See infra note 37 (recognizing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1990), as a
government speech case);see also Alana C. Hake, Note, The States, A Plate, And The First
Amendment: The “Choose Life” Specialty License Plate As Government Speech, 85 WASH.
U. L. REV. 409, 422 (2007) (observing that Rust has been recognized as the ―fountainhead‖
of the government-speech doctrine).
31. 500 U.S. 173 (1990).
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 300a-6 (2006).
33. Rust, 500 U.S. at 181.
34. Id. The challenged regulations in Rust laid out three conditions that, if not satisfied
by Title X projects and their staff, prohibited the disbursement of funds. Id. at 179–81.
First, the regulations forbade ―counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method of
family planning or [referrals] for abortion as a method of family planning‖ and ―expressly
prohibited [Title X projects] from referring a pregnant woman to an abortion provider, even
upon specific request.‖ Id. at 179. Second, the regulations prohibited recipients of Title X
funds from ―engaging in activities that ‗encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a
method of family planning,‘‖ such as ―lobbying for legislation that would increase the
availability of abortion as a method of family planning, developing or disseminating
materials advocating abortion,‖ or ―providing speakers to promote abortion.‖ Id. at 180.
Lastly, the regulations mandated that all Title X-projects be organized in such a way as to be
―‗physically and financially separate‘ from prohibited abortion activities.‖ Id.
35. Id. at 193.
36. Id.
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Court recognized that its decision in Rust was based on government-speech
concerns and that the Title X-funded doctors were essentially speaking on
behalf of the government.37
In 2001, the Court came to a very different conclusion in a
case involving facts similar to those in Rust.38 Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez39 involved a restriction that prohibited attorneys who received
money from the government-funded Legal Services Corporation (LSC)
from seeking to amend or challenge existing welfare law on behalf of their
clients.40 As in Rust, the Court had to determine whether the government
could limit what individuals participating in a government-funded program
could say without running afoul of the First Amendment.41 The Court, in
another 5-4 decision, held that the restrictions did violate the First
Amendment.42 It reasoned that, unlike the government program in Rust,
the LSC program ―was designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote
a governmental message.‖43 The purpose of the LSC program, according
to the majority, was to provide indigent citizens with attorneys who would
best represent the interests of their clients,44 while the purpose of the
program in Rust was for the government to fund family planning measures
it believed best served the interests of the general public.45
Several years later, in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association,46 the
Court expanded on its government-speech doctrine by laying out two
criteria it found to be particularly instructive when determining whether
37. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (―The Court in
Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities . . .
amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we
have explained Rust on this understanding.‖); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (―[In Rust, we recognized that w]hen the government
disburses public funds to . . . convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and
appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted . . . .‖). But see
Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (―If the private doctors‘ confidential
advice to their patients at issue in Rust constituted ‗government speech,‘ it is hard to
imagine what subsidized speech would not be government speech.‖).
38. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 558–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the statutory
scheme in Velazquez was ―indistinguishable in all relevant aspects from‖ the scheme upheld
in Rust); Note, The Curious Relationship Between the Compelled Speech and Government
Speech Doctrines, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2411, 2430 (2004) (―In soft focus, Velazquez appears
indistinguishable from Rust . . . .‖).
39. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
40. Id. at 536–37.
41. Id. at 539.
42. Id. at 537.
43. Id. at 542.
44. See id. (―The LSC Lawyer . . . speaks on behalf of his or her private, indigent
client.‖).
45. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text (describing the Court‘s interpretation
of the purpose of the program in Rust).
46. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
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certain speech is governmental or private. In Johanns, two associations of
beef producers challenged the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985
(Beef Act)47 on First Amendment grounds.48 As part of an overarching
goal of promoting the American beef industry, the Beef Act imposed a tax
on beef producers and designated that part of the tax revenue be used to
fund an advertising campaign with the trademarked slogan, ―Beef. It‘s
What‘s for Dinner.‖49 Many of these generic advertisements also bore the
message ―Funded by America‘s Beef Producers.‖50 The beef producers
who challenged the program claimed that the generic advertising campaign
funded by their tax dollars violated their First Amendment rights by
impeding ―their efforts to promote the superiority of‖ their own specialty
beef and beef brands.51 The Court, however, held that there was no
violation of the beef producers‘ First Amendment rights because, since the
government created and maintained administrative control over the
program, the messages were government speech.52 Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia laid out two criteria the Court found to be
determinative of whether the beef ads constituted governmental or private
speech: the government (1) set the overall message communicated; and (2)
approved every word that was disseminated.53
In its most recent decision involving the government-speech doctrine,
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,54 the Court addressed the question of
whether privately funded monuments displayed in a public park were
government or private speech.55 In Summum, the Church of Summum
(Summum), a religious organization headquartered in Utah, filed an action
against Pleasant Grove City (Pleasant Grove) after it had rejected
Summum‘s repeated requests to erect a monument containing ―the Seven
Aphorisms of Summum‖56 in Pleasant Grove‘s Pioneer Park.57 At the time

47. 7 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006).
48. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 556.
49. Id. at 554.
50. Id. at 555. The ―Cattlemen‘s Beef Promotion and Research Board‖ was appointed
by the Secretary of Agriculture and approved the messages and slogans in the promotional
ads. Id. at 553–55.
51. Id. at 556.
52. Id. at 560–62.
53. See id. (noting that Congress implemented the promotional program and set the
overarching message along with the Secretary of Agriculture, who ―exercise[d] final
approval authority over every word used‖). At least one circuit has used these criteria to
establish a two-pronged government-speech test. See infra Part II.B (discussing the Sixth
Circuit‘s incorporation of the Johanns criteria in its government-speech test).
54. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
55. Id. at 1129.
56. See id. at 1129–30 n.1 (describing the Seven Aphorisms of Summum as explained
in the respondent‘s brief); see also Summum—Seven Summum Principles,
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of Summum‘s request, Pioneer Park had at least eleven permanent displays
donated by private organizations or individuals, including a Ten
Commandments monument.58 Summum claimed that Pleasant Grove had
engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by allowing the Ten
Commandments monument to be displayed in the park but rejecting a
proposed monument that touched on the general tenets of its own faith.59
The Court unanimously found the Pioneer Park monuments to be
government speech, with eight justices concluding that ―the placement of a
permanent monument in a public park is best viewed as a form of
government speech‖; accordingly, the government was not required to
maintain viewpoint neutrality in its selection process.60 Notably, the
majority cited the government‘s degree of editorial control,61 the
monument‘s permanence,62 and the fact that observers ―routinely-and
reasonably-interpret [donated monuments] as conveying some message on
the property owner‘s behalf‖ as important factors guiding its decision.63
Concurring with the majority in Summum,64 Justice Souter cautioned the
Court against ―relying on a per se rule to say when speech is
governmental.‖65 He noted that sectarian identifications—such as a
Christian cross or a Jewish Star of David—on markers in national
cemeteries are one instance in which ―permanent monuments‖ on public
land do not appear to be government speech, but rather the speech of
private individuals.66 Informed by the Establishment Clause and its
endorsement test,67 Justice Souter concluded that whether a monument is
http://www.summum.us/philosophy/principles.shtml (last visited Aug. 2, 2010) (explaining
the Seven Aphorisms in detail).
57. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1130.
60. Id. at 1129.
61. See id. at 1134 (―[T]he City has ‗effectively controlled‘ the messages sent by the
monuments in the Park . . . .‖).
62. See id. at 1137 (―[M]onuments . . . endure. They monopolize the use of the land on
which they stand and interfere permanently with other uses of public space.‖).
63. See id. at 1133 (concluding that it is uncommon for a property owner to allow
―permanent monuments that convey a message with which they do not wish to be
associated‖ onto their land).
64. Id. at 1141.
65. Id. at 1142.
66. Id.
67. See id. (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that the reasonable-observer test he employs
is similar to the endorsement test used in Establishment Clause cases). Acknowledging that
Summum was litigated with ―one eye on the Establishment Clause,‖ Justice Souter was
concerned with the ways in which the developing government-speech doctrine may affect
the Establishment Clause doctrine. Id. at 1141. He believed that his proposed reasonableobserver test would ―serve coherence within Establishment Clause law‖ because of its
parallels with the endorsement test. Id. at 1142; see also Patrick M. Garry, Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum: The Supreme Court Finds a Public Display of the Ten Commandments

CARL DENIGRIS 60.1

144

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:133

government speech depends on the specific context in which it is
displayed.68 He stated that the best approach to determine whether the
monuments were government speech was to ―ask whether a reasonable and
fully informed observer would understand the expression to be government
speech.‖69 Applying this reasonable observer test to the facts in Summum,
Justice Souter came to the same conclusion as the majority: the
monuments in Pioneer Park were clearly government speech.70
Since its decision in Rust, the Supreme Court has articulated and
reaffirmed the broad outlines of the government-speech doctrine, but has
yet to articulate a ―clear standard . . . for determining when the government
is ‗speaking.‘‖71 Without a clear standard established by the Court, the
circuit courts have created their own tests for determining what qualifies as
government speech.72 As recent lower court decisions involving specialty
license plates show, this has led to inconsistent and convoluted findings in
the realm of the government-speech doctrine.73
B. License to Speak: Circuit Courts’ Use of the Government-Speech
Doctrine
At the circuit court level, much of the jurisprudence surrounding the
government-speech doctrine in the last decade has involved specialty
license plates and whether personalized messages on state-issued license
plates constitute government or private speech.74 In Sons of Confederate
Veterans, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor

To Be Permissible Government Speech, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 271, 286 (2009) (―In his
Summum concurrence, Justice Souter suggested that the endorsement test should be used to
evaluate the relationship between the government speech doctrine and the Establishment
Clause.‖).
68. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring) (―[T]here are circumstances in
which government maintenance of monuments does not look like government speech at
all.‖).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1141.
71. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm‘r of the Va. Dep‘t of Motor Vehicles,
288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002).
72. See, e.g., id. (establishing a four-factor test); ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d
370, 380 (6th Cir. 2006) (adopting a two-factor test based on the criteria mentioned in
Johanns).
73. See infra Part II.B (discussing the circuits‘ inconsistency in the specialty license
plate cases); see also Adam Liptak, Is That Plate Speaking for the Driver or the State?, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2009, at A12 (acknowledging a ―doctrinal free-for-all‖ among the circuit
courts‘ specialty license plate cases).
74. See Goldfaden, supra note 21, at 280 (―[S]pecialty license plates have become the
frontline in the battle against government censorship of free speech.‖); infra Part II.B
(examining recent specialty license plate cases coming out of the circuit courts); see also
Liptak, supra note 73 (noting that ―the volume of litigation‖ involving specialty plates has
led many to believe the Supreme Court must step in).
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Vehicles,75 a provision in a Virginia specialty license plate statute
prohibited the Sons of Confederate Veterans76 (SCV) from using its logo
incorporating the Confederate flag on the organization‘s specialty plates.77
The SCV brought an action to enjoin the DMV commissioner from
enforcing this provision, arguing that the prohibition violated SCV‘s First
Amendment speech rights,78 while the State argued that no such violation
existed because the SCV plates, and all Virginia specialty plates, were
government speech.79 To determine whether the specialty plates were
government speech, the Fourth Circuit established a four-factor test that
looked to the following:
(1) [T]he central ―purpose‖ of the program in which the speech occurs;
(2) the degree of ―editorial control‖ exercised by the government or
private entities over the content of the speech; (3) the identity of the
―literal speaker‖; and (4) whether the government or the private entity
bears the ―ultimate responsibility‖ for the content of the speech.80

Applying this test to the SCV specialty plate program, the Fourth Circuit
determined that the plates constituted private speech and that the
prohibition of the Confederate flag was, therefore, unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination.81
The Fourth Circuit again applied its four-factor test two years later in
Planned Parenthood of South Carolina Inc. v. Rose.82 This time, the court
used the test to determine whether a ―Choose Life‖ specialty plate program
established by the South Carolina legislature was government speech—
allowing the state to exclude the opposing pro-choice viewpoint—or

75. 288 F.3d 610 (4th Cir. 2002).
76. The Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. is a non-profit corporation whose members
are descendants of Confederate army veterans. See id. at 613 n.1.
77. Id. at 613. The specific statute that authorized the issuance of specialty plates to
SCV members provided that ―no logo or emblem of any description shall be displayed or
incorporated into . . . this section.‖ Id.
78. Id. at 614.
79. Id. at 615.
80. Id. at 618. The court derived these four factors from a number of criteria that other
circuits found to be determinative in speech analysis. See id. at 619 (―We find the recent
approaches of our sister circuits instructive here.‖). The majority acknowledged, however,
that it did not believe these factors ―constitute[d] an exhaustive or always-applicable list‖
but that they did resolve the issue before the court. Id.
81. See id. at 619 (finding the ―purpose‖ of the program was to generate revenue for the
state while providing citizens with a means to ―express their pride‖ in an organization).
Considering the rest of the factors, the court found the following: the Virginia legislature
exercises ―little, if any, [editorial] control,‖ the ―literal speaker‖ is the vehicle‘s owner
―because of the connection of any message on the plate to the driver,‖ and it is unclear who
bears ―ultimate responsibility.‖ Id. at 620–21. Weighing all these factors led the court ―to
conclude that the SCV‘s special plates constitute private speech.‖ Id. at 621.
82. 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004).
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private speech—making such viewpoint discrimination unconstitutional.83
The court held that the ―Choose Life‖ plates constituted hybrid speech,84 or
―a mixture of private and government speech.‖85 It then concluded that the
State should not be allowed to discriminate based on viewpoint when
speech is both government and private because the ―State‘s advocacy of the
pro-life viewpoint may not be readily apparent to those who see the Choose
Life plate,‖86 thus insulating the State from electoral accountability.87
Finding that the ―Choose Life‖ specialty plate program violated the First
Amendment, the court invalidated the enacting statute.88
The Ninth Circuit has also adopted the four-factor SCV test believing it
to be an effective tool for distinguishing government and private speech. 89
In Arizona Life Coalition Inc. v. Stanton,90 the Ninth Circuit used the test
and concluded that, while the contested ―Choose Life‖ specialty plates did
have some characteristics that suggested they might be government speech,
the overall balance of the four factors tipped in favor of private speech. 91
Of particular note, the court found the fact that license plates are owned by
the state suggested that the government was the literal speaker, but
ultimately concluded that the decision in Wooley indicated that license
plates implicate strong private speech rights.92

83. Id. at 792.
84. While speech is generally characterized as private or governmental, some courts—
although notably not the Supreme Court—and scholars have argued that a large amount of
speech should be classified as mixed government-private speech, and that mislabeling such
speech could have negative consequences on the government-speech doctrine. See
generally Corbin, supra note 2, at 607–08 (2008) (observing that ―not all speech is purely
private or purely governmental‖ and arguing that the classification of ―mixed speech as
purely private or purely governmental masks the competing interests at play‖).
85. Rose, 361 F.3d at 793. Because the ―Choose Life‖ plates were specifically
approved by the legislature, the ―degree of editorial control‖ factor weighed heavily towards
finding the state to be the speaker. Id. But the ―literal speaker‖ and ―ultimate
responsibility‖ factors were seen as weighing in favor of private speech, as ―no one who
sees a specialty license plate imprinted with the phrase ‗Choose Life‘ would doubt that the
owner of that vehicle holds a pro-life viewpoint.‖ Id. at 794. But see Choose Life Ill., Inc.
v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 867–68 (7th Cir. 2008) (Manion, J., concurring) (―The [Choose
Life] message acknowledges both choice and life . . . . [This] petition expressly recognizes
that it is the woman‘s choice. But at the same time it recognizes that the life of the
developing baby is also at stake.‖).
86. Rose, 361 F.3d at 795.
87. See generally Saumya Manohar, Comment, Look Who’s Talking Now: “Choose
Life” License Plates And Deceptive Government Speech, 25 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 229,
237 (2006) (―Deceptive speech allows the government to manipulate the ‗free discussion‘
essential to deliberative democracy.‖).
88. Rose, 361 F.3d at 799–800.
89. Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 2008).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 968.
92. Id. at 966–67.
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While the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have employed a circuit-created
four-factor test when deciding whether speech is governmental or private,93
the Sixth Circuit has looked to the Supreme Court for guidance.94 Using
the criteria mentioned in Johanns, the Sixth Circuit adopted a two-pronged
government-speech test in ACLU of Tennessee v. Bredesen.95 First, the test
looked to whether the government set the overall message communicated;
second, it looked to whether the government approved every word that was
disseminated.96 Applying this two-pronged test to yet another ―Choose
Life‖ specialty plate program, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the
Tennessee legislature set the overall message as well as approved every
word used on the specialty plates.97 The plates, therefore, were found to be
government speech expressing the legislature‘s own views on the abortion
debate.98 Significantly, the court justified its finding by saying, ―the
medium in this case [is] a government-issued license plate that every
reasonable person knows to be government-issued.‖99
Two other recent ―Choose Life‖ specialty license plate cases from the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits have synthesized the current governmentspeech case law and attempted to simplify the government-speech tests.100
While the Seventh Circuit in Choose Life Illinois, Inc. v. White101 found the
exclusion of the entire subject of abortion to be a permissible ―content
based but viewpoint neutral‖ restriction102 and the Eighth Circuit in Roach

93. See supra note 80 (acknowledging that the four-factor test was based on criteria
taken from other circuits).
94. See ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 375–76 (6th Cir. 2006) (using the
Supreme Court‘s decision in Johanns to establish a government-speech test).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 375.
97. See id. at 376 (concluding that the Tennessee legislature ―chose the ‗Choose Life‘
plate‘s overarching message . . . when it spelled out in the statute‖ the specific words to be
placed on the plates).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 377 (emphasis added). But see Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956,
968 (9th Cir. 2008) (―[T]here is nothing . . . to even suggest that [the state] intended to adopt
the message of each special organization plate as its own state speech.‖).
100. See Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009) (―Our analysis boils down
to one key question: whether, under all the circumstances, a reasonable and fully informed
observer would consider the speaker to be the government or a private party.‖); Choose Life
Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that the Fourth and Ninth
Circuit multi-factor tests can be ―distilled‖ by focusing on whether, under all the
circumstances, a reasonable person would consider the speaker to be the government or a
private entity).
101. 547 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009).
102. Id. at 855–56. But cf. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 831 (1995) (―The dissent‘s assertion that no viewpoint discrimination occurs
because [there is discrimination] against an entire class of viewpoints reflects an
insupportable assumption that all debate is bipolar.‖).
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v. Stouffer103 found the denial of a ―Choose Life‖ specialty plate application
to be unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination,104 both circuits concluded
that the specialty plates were primarily private speech.105
More
importantly, both circuits acknowledged that the ―key question‖ in
government-speech analysis is whether a reasonable person would, under
all the circumstances, see the speech to be governmental or private.106
Although the Supreme Court has recently denied certiorari in White,107 it
is likely that the question of whether specialty license plates are private or
government speech will come before it again in the near future.108 When it
does, the Court should use the opportunity to provide the circuits with a
uniform and effective government-speech test.109 Any effort at establishing
a coherent speech test, however, should be informed by the brief, although
convoluted, history of the government-speech doctrine,110 as well as the
long body of Establishment Clause doctrine that has touched on
government-speech restrictions.111
C. Government Speech and Religion: The Establishment Clause
Endorsement Test
Long before the Supreme Court began to etch the broad contours of its
government-speech doctrine, it dealt with the limitations placed on
government speech through the Establishment Clause.112 Throughout its
long history of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Court has
attempted to draw lines between those government activities that use
religious symbols in a secular and constitutionally permissible manner and
103. 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009).
104. Id. at 870.
105. Id. at 868; White, 547 F.3d at 864.
106. See supra note 100 (describing the Eighth and Seventh Circuits‘ reasonable person
analyses).
107. Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009).
108. See Liptak, supra note 20 (noting that this is a ―heavily litigated question‖ that has
come before the Court at least five previous times).
109. See discussion infra Parts II, III (explaining the problems with the current
government-speech tests and arguing for a more coherent and workable approach to the
government-speech doctrine).
110. See supra Part I.A–B (discussing the history of the government-speech doctrine).
111. See infra Part I.C (discussing the relationship between government speech and the
Establishment Clause).
112. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009) (acknowledging
that government speech is restrained by the Establishment Clause); County of Allegheny v.
ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989) (―[I]t has been noted that the
prohibition against governmental endorsement of religion ‗preclude[s] government from
conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is
favored or preferred.‘‖ (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985)(O‘Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment))); Corbin, supra note 2, at 615–18 (discussing the limits that the
Establishment Clause places on the government‘s ability to speak on matters of religion).
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those activities that are an unconstitutional endorsement of religion.113 But
just as determining what is government speech has proven to be a difficult
task for the courts, deciding whether a certain government activity amounts
to government endorsement of religion has proven to be complex,
convoluted, and extremely fact intensive.114
Seven years prior to the Court‘s decision in Rust, Justice O‘Connor
sought to clarify the prevailing Establishment Clause test.115 Concurring
with the majority‘s judgment in Lynch v. Donnelley,116 Justice O‘Connor
first noted the constitutional concerns of government endorsement of
religion: ―Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders . . . and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders.‖117 She then laid out the rationale for what would become the
Establishment Clause ―endorsement test,‖ recognizing that the ―crucial
[factor] is that a government practice not have the effect of communicating
a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion‖ because
―[i]t is only practices having that effect . . . that make religion relevant.‖118
Five years after Lynch, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter,119 Justice O‘Connor further articulated what she saw as the
important inquiry of the endorsement test, stating that the central question
of endorsement analysis is ―whether a reasonable observer would view‖
certain government practices as an endorsement of religion.120 Such a test,
she explained, must be ―highly context specific‖ in order to determine the
effect on the reasonable observer of the challenged government practice.121
Although it was not unanimously accepted as an effective tool of
analysis,122 the endorsement test has been routinely used in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.123 This is because the test has been recognized as
―captur[ing] the essential mandate of the Establishment Clause,‖ due to its
113. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) (acknowledging that the test to
determine whether the government has violated the Establishment Clause ―calls for line
drawing‖ between permissible and impermissible government association with religion).
114. See id. at 679 (―The [Establishment] Clause erects a ‗blurred, indistinct, and
variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.‘‖ (quoting
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971))).
115. Id. at 687 (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (―I write separately to suggest a clarification
of our Establishment Clause doctrine.‖).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 688.
118. Id. at 692.
119. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
120. Id. at 631 (O‘Connor, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 630–31.
122. See id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part) (finding the endorsement test to be
―flawed‖ and ―unworkable‖).
123. See Garry, supra note 67, at 285 (acknowledging that courts have frequently used
the endorsement test when analyzing the constitutionality of religious displays).
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focus on the audience of the challenged practice.124
Since the
Establishment Clause itself has been understood to be an explicit
constitutional check on government speech,125 an effective governmentspeech
test
should
be
mindful of the relationship between the Establishment Clause and
government-speech doctrines. Recently, Justice Souter recognized the
relationship between these two doctrines when he cited the endorsement
test as the basis for the ―reasonable observer test‖ used in his Summum
concurrence.126 The endorsement test, therefore, should provide an
instructive model when formulating a new government-speech test.
II. CURRENT SPEECH TESTS DO NOT ENSURE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY, LEAD TO INCONSISTENT RESULTS, AND DO NOT
PROVIDE ADEQUATE FIRST AMENDMENT SAFEGUARDS
As explained above, the central purpose of the government-speech
doctrine, or the government-speech defense, is to allow the government to
control its own message without the limitations that the First Amendment
places on it when it accommodates or invites private speech. 127 Thus, any
test that distinguishes governmental from private speech must focus on this
core idea. But a truly effective government-speech test must also account
for the fact that ―the First Amendment protects [the] individual‘s free
speech rights from infringement by the government; it does not exist to
protect the government from free speech claims by would-be speakers.‖128
This point underscores two general criticisms of the government-speech
doctrine.
The first concern surrounding the application of the government-speech
doctrine is that it might be used to silence speech that the government does
not approve of, even in cases where the speech is not reasonably attributed
to the government.129 For example, the court in Rose warned that accepting
124. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 631 (O‘Connor, J., concurring); accord Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (―Focusing on . . . endorsement or
disapproval of religion clarifies the [current Establishment Clause] test as an analytical
device.‖).
125. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (describing the Establishment Clause as
an explicit constitutional check on government speech).
126. See Garry, supra note 67, at 284 (discussing Justice Souter‘s recognition of a
relationship between the government-speech and Establishment Clause doctrines and his
concerns with the effect of government-speech analysis on Establishment Clause analysis).
127. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text (discussing the essential purpose of
the government-speech defense).
128. Dolan, supra note 6, at 125.
129. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009) (recognizing
that there is a legitimate concern that the government-speech doctrine could ―be used as a
subterfuge for favoring certain private speakers over others based on viewpoint‖); see also
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the ―Choose Life‖ plates as government speech would have allowed South
Carolina to continue favoring its own pro-life viewpoint while effectively
silencing the pro-choice position in what appeared to be a limited forum for
expressive speech.130 Second, there is a fear that the government might
evade political accountability if it were allowed to maintain strong editorial
control over a message that is not reasonably attributed to it.131 This
concern was also acknowledged in Rose when the court recognized that,
because ―the State‘s advocacy of the pro-life viewpoint may not be readily
apparent to those who see the Choose Life plate,‖ South Carolina would
have been insulated from electoral accountability if the plates were found
to be government speech.132 The current government-speech tests do little
to address either concern.
A. The Beef With Johanns: No Concern for Attribution
To understand the inherent problems of the Johanns two factor test, with
its focus on whether or not the government set the overall message and
approved every word in the message, it is best to begin with the key
observations made by the Johanns dissenters. In their dissent, Justices
Souter, Stevens and Kennedy identified what they saw as two clear
principles of the ―relatively new‖ government-speech doctrine: (1) the
necessity of recognizing government‘s power to speak and to determine its
own message without First Amendment viewpoint limitations; and (2) the
importance of being able to identify which speech is the government‘s so
that it may be held accountable by the electorate for such speech.133 If one
of the central rationales behind the government-speech doctrine is that the
government is accountable to the electorate for the messages it conveys,134
Note, supra note 38, at 2418 (―Because such an image looks a lot like the government . . .
evaluating competing viewpoints, the current government speech doctrine makes for an
unconvincing safeguard against the endangerment of private speech rights.‖).
130. See Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 795 (4th Cir. 2004)
(―[T]he State has favored itself as a speaker within the license plate forum, giving its own
viewpoint privilege above others.‖).
131. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass‘n, 544 U.S. 550, 578–79 (2005) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (―Unless the putative government speech appears to be coming from the
government, its governmental origin cannot possibly justify the burden on the First
Amendment interests of the dissenters targeted to pay for it.‖); see also Manohar, supra note
87, at 234–35 (recognizing that the government may use its newly developed speech defense
to ―monopolize or distort the marketplace of ideas‖ or ―to indoctrinate and to dull the
individual‘s ability to think critically‖).
132. Rose, 361 F.3d at 795.
133. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 574–75.
134. See supra notes 5–10 and accompanying text (identifying democratic accountability
as an important notion underlying the government-speech doctrine); accord Norton, supra
note 11, at 22 (―Political accountability, rather than the Free Speech Clause, provides the
recourse for those unhappy with their government‘s expressive choices.‖).
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then the majority‘s decision in Johanns does little to support this concept of
electoral accountability.135
In Johanns, the majority casually brushed over the possibility that the
audience of the government‘s promotional speech program might attribute
the ads to the beef producers.136 With little explanation, the Court found
that the promotional ads ―labeled as coming from ‗America‘s Beef
Producers‘‖ were ―not sufficiently specific to convince a reasonable
factfinder‖ that the beef producers would be associated with the content of
the ads.137 The Court based these findings on the two-factor test described
earlier in this Comment: did the government (1) set the overall message
communicated; and (2) approve every word that was disseminated?138
There are several problems with using this analysis as a government-speech
test.139
First, there is so much overlap between these two factors that they can
effectively be reduced to a single inquiry: Did the government exercise a
strong degree of editorial control over the message?140 Such a narrowly
135. See infra notes 136–145 and accompanying text.
136. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 565–66 (acknowledging that the beef producers First
Amendment challenge might have been successful ―if it were established . . . that individual
beef advertisements were attributed to [them],‖ but finding that ―the trial record is altogether
silent‖ on this matter).
137. Id. at 566. Justice Scalia does note, albeit without much support, that the
trademarked title ―America‘s Beef Producers‖ could just as likely have been interpreted as
―refer[ing] to a particular organization of beef producers.‖ Id. at 566 n.11.
138. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (describing the Johanns test); see also
Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 865 (8th Cir. 2009) (―Johanns stands for the proposition
that when the government determines an overarching message and retains power to approve
every word disseminated at its behest, the message must be attributed to the government for
First Amendment purposes.‖ (quoting ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 375 (6th
Cir. 2006))).
139. See infra notes 140–155 and accompanying text (discussing the problems with the
Johanns test). Besides the problems discussed in this Comment, it has also been argued that
the Court‘s analysis in Johanns is specifically designed for the facts in the case and is not
necessarily to be used by the courts in other distinguishable government-speech cases. See,
e.g., Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 385 (Martin, J., dissenting) (concluding that the Johanns test is
applicable to the compelled subsidy case it was first applied to, but does not work in the
specialty license plate context). Moreover, the Court‘s rationale in Johanns seems
somewhat conclusory: certainly whether the government has ―effectively controlled‖ a
message can only be discerned after the message is determined to be government speech,
because a government-speech defense allows the government to effectively protect its
message against First Amendment challenges. See supra note 12 and accompanying text
(describing the speech powers exercised through the government-speech defense).
140. See Stephanie S. Bell, Note, The First Amendment and Specialty License Plates:
The “Choose Life” Controversy, 73 MO. L. REV. 1279, 1298 (2008) (noting that the ―only
factor considered in the Johanns test is that of editorial control‖); accord Roach v. Stouffer,
560 F.3d 860, 864 (8th Cir. 2009) (interpreting the holding in Johanns as ―the more control
the government has over the content of the speech, the more likely it is to be government
speech‖). Exercising ―editorial control,‖ as discussed here, refers to the process of
―selecting and compiling‖ messages and determining the means by which these messages
are conveyed. See Jacobs, supra note 4, at 50–52 (explaining the role of ―government
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focused speech test, however, does not take into account the major
concerns surrounding the government-speech doctrine, namely, whether the
audience attributes a specific message to the government or to a private
entity.141 The dissent recognized this flaw in the majority‘s analysis when
it took issue with the fact that the advertisements were put forth as coming
from ―America‘s Beef Producers.‖142 The dissenters argued that ―if
government relies on the government-speech doctrine to compel specific
groups to fund speech,‖ it must ensure that the speech is identifiable as its
own in order to ―make itself politically accountable.‖143 The Beef Act, as
the dissent recognized, ―d[id] not establish an advertising scheme subject to
effective democratic checks‖144 because it effectively ensured that the
advertisements would be attributed to ―America‘s Beef Producers.‖145
Responding to the dissent‘s concerns that government-speech not readily
identified as belonging to the government could insulate the government
from accountability and unnecessarily burden private speech,146 the
Johanns majority argued that it found no First Amendment provision even
hinting at a requirement that ―government speech funded by a targeted
assessment must identify government as speaker.‖147 While this is true on
its face, it is a shortsighted analysis of the government-speech doctrine148
that misses a fundamental point of the court-created government-speech
defense: it is used to limit the application of First Amendment free speech
safeguards.149 Any doctrine that could have such severe ramifications on
editors‖ in programs designed to disseminate messages through private speakers). Thus, the
―editor label‖ is appropriate ―whenever [there is a choice] among private speakers‖ or
messages. Id. at 71.
141. Bell, supra note 140, at 1299 (recognizing that one of the ―major concern[s] with
the Johanns test is that it fails to address the problem of attribution‖); see also infra notes
179–181 and accompanying text (arguing that an effective government-speech test should
focus on the perceptions of the reasonable observer of contested speech).
142. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 577.
143. Id. at 571.
144. Id. at 577.
145. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the tagline ―Funded by America‘s Beef
Producers‖ would lead anyone reading it to believe that the message was from America‘s
Beef Producers and not the federal government).
146. Id. at 578–79.
147. See id. at 564 n.7 (finding that such a disclaimer ―is more than we think can be
found within ‗Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.‘‖).
148. See Manohar, supra note 87, at 236–37 (noting that, while ―deceptive government
speech does not violate the letter of the First Amendment,‖ the Supreme Court has
consistently dismissed ―any narrow, literal conception‖ of the First Amendment because it is
understood that ―the Framers were concerned with broad principles, and wrote against a
background of shared values and practices‖).
149. See Pleasant City Grove v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (―The Free
Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate
government speech.‖); see also Johanns, 544 U.S. at 578 (―[T]he Government‘s own speech
. . . is exempt from First Amendment Scrutiny.‖); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic
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free speech rights should only be applied after strict scrutiny of the contexts
in which it is invoked.150 Furthermore, in order to remain faithful to the
government-speech doctrine‘s underlying premise of electoral
accountability, such contextual scrutiny should focus on the perceptions of
the audience of contested speech.151
The misguided focus of the Johanns test is most evident when
it is applied to the specialty license plate context. As Bredesen
demonstrates, applying the Johanns test to the specialty plate cases leads to
a finding that such plates are government speech.152 This is because
specialty license plate programs are usually created by statutory schemes
designed by state legislatures, which suggests that legislators maintain
―effective editorial control‖ of the messages on specialty plates.153 But
focusing on the editorial control factor does not give due weight to what the
audience of a license plate might perceive, and thus seems to conflict with
the Court‘s finding in Wooley which suggested that messages on license
plates strongly implicate the speech rights of the vehicle‘s owner.154 The
state motto ―Live Free or Die‖ was certainly, from beginning to end,
determined by the State of New Hampshire, yet it did not outweigh the
Nat‘l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139, n. 7 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (―Government is not
restricted by the First Amendment from controlling its own expression.‖); Norton, supra
note 11, at 25 (―Government‘s claim to speech arises most frequently as a defense to First
Amendment challenges by private speakers.‖).
150. See infra note 178; see also RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 338 (2004) (―Courts are prepared to require
this when a fundamental right, such as the right of freedom of speech, is being infringed.‖);
cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503–04 (1965) (White, J., concurring)
(―[S]tatutes regulating sensitive areas of liberty do, under the cases of [the Supreme Court],
require ‗strict scrutiny.‘‖). While it may seem that strict scrutiny analysis is inappropriate in
a speech context that is clearly governmental in nature, such as a speech by the president,
this Comment assumes that: (1) such speech is unlikely to be challenged on First
Amendment grounds because of its clear nature; and (2) such speech would pass strict
scrutiny analysis because of the strong government interest in being able to conduct these
speech activities which are so central to the function of government. See supra note 2
(describing the presidential press conference as a clear example of government speech);
Bezanson & Buss, supra note 5, at 1380 (―Speech is but one means that government must
have at its disposal to conduct its affairs and to accomplish its ends.‖ (emphasis added)).
151. See supra notes 141–45 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
observers being able to correctly identify government speech in order for the government to
be held accountable for such speech).
152. ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 380 (6th Cir. 2006).
153. See, e.g., id. at 376 (noting that ―Tennessee set the overall message‖ of its specialty
plate program).
154. See Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 967 (9th Cir. 2008)
(acknowledging that the Wooley Court indicated that license plate messages ―implicate
private speech interests because of the connection of any message on the plate to the driver
or owner of the vehicle‖ (quoting Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm‘r of the Va.
Dep‘t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 621 (4th Cir. 2002))); Lim, supra note 18, at 592
(―The Court [in Wooley] implicitly held that messages on license plates involve privatespeech interests.‖).
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private speech interests involved.155 Even more to the point, determining
whether speech is governmental or private by asking who maintains a
strong ―degree of editorial control‖ does not take into account the crucial
fact that people who purchase specialty plates choose to actively associate
with a specific organization or message.156 This is perhaps the most
striking point regarding whether to accept the Johanns test as a legitimate
government-speech test in the specialty plate context: taken to its logical
conclusion, Johanns leads to outcomes that are entirely inconsistent with
the Court‘s holding in Wooley.157
B. The Four-Factor Folly: Ill-Defined and Inconsistently Applied
Although a number of circuits have accepted the four-factor test as a
legitimate and effective means of distinguishing government speech from
private speech,158 this test also has significant flaws. While these factors
may have a place in government-speech analysis, the problem with the
four-factor test as it has been applied by the circuits is that the factors are
not well-defined and do not properly focus on the reasonable observer of
the message.159 This has led to inconsistent results in the application of the
four-factor test.160
For instance, when applying the four-factor test to specialty license
plates, courts have come to differing conclusions under similar factual
situations.161 In Stanton, the district court analyzed a ―Choose Life‖
specialty plate program using the four-factor test and found that the factors

155. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
156. See Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 868 (8th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that vehicle
owners take ―the initiative to purchase the specialty plate,‖ thus, reasonable observers are
likely to perceive the vehicle owner as ―voluntarily communicating his or her own
message‖); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008) (observing that
vehicle owners choose to display specialty plates, suggesting that the owners are ―the most
obvious speakers in the specialty plate context‖); Stanton, 515 F.3d at 967 (recognizing that
―[p]rivate individuals choose to spend additional money to obtain [specialty] plate[s]‖ and
finding this fact to support the classification of specialty plates as private speech).
157. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass‘n, 544 U.S. 550, 578 (2005) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (acknowledging that ―if messages on license plates implicated no private-speech
interests at all, then Wooley (among other cases) would have come out differently‖).
158. See supra Part I.B (defining the four-factor test and identifying the circuits that have
applied it).
159. See infra notes 166–176 and accompanying text (discussing the inherent problems
with the four-factor test).
160. See infra notes 162–165 and accompanying text (describing the inconsistent results
coming from the four-factor analysis).
161. See Lim, supra note 18, at 585 (―The inconsistent results produced by the fourfactor test are especially apparent in specialty-plate cases, as courts have reached different
conclusion in cases with strikingly similar facts.‖).
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weighed heavily in favor of government speech.162 Upon review, however,
the Ninth Circuit applied the same four-factor test and concluded that
specialty license plates are private speech, overturning the district court‘s
decision.163 In Rose, the Fourth Circuit concluded that South Carolina‘s
―Choose Life‖ specialty plates should be seen as a mixture of government
and private speech.164 Strangely enough, in analyzing a different specialty
license plate program two years prior to its decision in Rose, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that the SCV specialty plates were a form of private
speech, never mentioning mixed speech.165
How does a test that appears to be so straightforward lead to such varied
results when applied to nearly identical factual situations? The major flaw
in the four-factor analysis is that the factors themselves are not welldefined, which makes it unclear how each relates to the question of whether
the speech is governmental or private.166 For example, in the case of
specialty license plates, how should a court determine the ―central purpose‖
of a specialty license plate program when there appear to be multiple,
legitimate purposes?167 Which ―degree of editorial control‖ factor should
weigh more heavily: the fact that it usually takes a legislative act to create
a specialty license program, or the fact that private organizations often
design the specialty plates that represent their own views and the views of
their members?168 Assuming that ―literal speaker‖ is not to be taken

162. See Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, No. CV031691PHXPGR, 2005 WL 2412811,
at *3–6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2005), rev’d, 515 F.3d 956, 968 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding the
―primary purpose‖ factor to weigh in favor of government speech because license plates
were primarily issued to identify vehicles and drivers).
163. Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 968 (9th Cir. 2008).
164. Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794 (4th Cir. 2004).
165. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm‘r of the Va. Dep‘t of Motor Vehicles,
288 F.3d 610, 621 (4th Cir. 2002).
166. See Norton, supra note 6, at 598 (―Courts‘ use of these factors . . . would be
significantly more defensible from both a theoretical and a practical standpoint if they
explained why they chose to rely on them—for example, by showing how each factor
furthers or frustrates a finding of a message‘s governmental source . . . .‖); Lim, supra note
18, at 585 (―The factors themselves are inherently nebulous and susceptible to manipulation,
failing to direct judicial decision-making, and case law has failed to clarify their
meanings.‖); cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688–89 (1984) (noting that it ―has never
been entirely clear‖ how the different parts of the Lemon test ―relate to the principles
enshrined in the Establishment Clause‖).
167. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 619 (looking at the central ―purpose‖
of the state‘s specialty license plate programs and concluding that the primary purpose is to
produce revenue for the state as well as provide a forum for the expression of private
views).
168. Compare Rose, 361 F.3d at 793 (finding the editorial control factor to weigh in
favor of government speech because ―the [Tennessee] legislature determined that the plate
will bear the message ‗Choose Life‘‖), with Stanton, 515 F.3d at 966 (finding the editorial
control factor to weigh in favor of private speech because ―the idea of a ‗Choose Life‘
license plate originated with‖ a private organization).

CARL DENIGRIS 60.1

2010]

WHEN LEVIATHAN SPEAKS

157

literally (as one must assume in the context of specialty license plates,
because neither license plates nor cars literally speak),169 is this factor and
the ―ultimate responsibility‖ factor to be ―assessed when the speech is
created, or when the speech is conveyed or displayed‖?170 Ultimate
responsibility itself seems to depend on who is determined to be the
speaker,171 suggesting that this factor can be dismissed as redundant and
irrelevant. How a court chooses to define each of these four factors and
their relationship to the distinction between government speech and private
speech determines whether it will view a specific form of speech as
governmental, private, or a mix of the two.
Recently, the Seventh Circuit has attempted to clarify the four-factor
government-speech test by ―distill[ing] (and simplify[ing])‖ the factors into
―the following inquiry: Under all the circumstances, would a reasonable
person consider the speaker to be the government or a private party?‖172
Applying this ―simplified‖ analysis to the Illinois specialty license plate
program, the court concluded that messages on license plates ―cannot be
characterized as the government‘s speech‖ but rather implicate strong
private speech rights.173 While the court‘s analysis seems to be a more
coherent and consistent approach to the government-speech test,174 there is
nothing in the Seventh Circuit‘s opinion suggesting that other courts using
the four-factor test will examine the factors from the perspective of the
reasonable observer of specialty plates.175 In fact, an analysis of specialty
license plate cases applying the four-factor test suggests that other circuits
have rarely focused their attention on the reasonable observer of the speech
169. See Lim, supra note 18, at 587 (distinguishing the context of radio broadcasts,
where there is always a literal speaker, from the specialty license-plate and monument
contexts, where ―literal‖ must be used in a ―non-literal sense‖).
170. See id. at 588 (noting that the court in Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995,
1004 (10th Cir. 2002), ―ultimately focused on the moment of creation‖ while other courts
have assessed the literal speaker at the time the speech was displayed).
171. See, e.g., Stanton, 515 F.3d at 967 (―The question of who bears ‗ultimate
responsibility‘ . . . is very similar to the question of who is the literal speaker.‖); Sons of
Confederate Veterans, Inc., 288 F.3d at 621 (finding the literal speaker and ultimate
responsibility factors to weigh heavily in favor of private speech because of the strong
connection between license plate messages and drivers as indicated in Wooley).
172. Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008); accord Roach v.
Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009) (―Our analysis boils down to one key question . .
. .‖).
173. White, 547 F.3d at 863 (finding individual vehicle owners to be the obvious
speakers of specialty license plates as they choose to display the plates).
174. See infra Part III.A (discussing why a reasonable observer test would benefit from
government speech analysis).
175. Indeed, the court‘s recommendation of factors to consider, which includes whether
―the message originates with the government‖ and ―the degree to which the government
exercises editorial control,‖ suggests that its ―reasonable person‖ does not necessarily have
to be an observer of the speech in question; rather they need only be an observer of the
structure of the contested speech program. See White, 547 F.3d at 863.
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in question.176 Perhaps this lack of focus on the audience is because it is
uncertain whether a reasonable observer of specialty license plates is aware
of the factors that are the focus of the four-factor test, suggesting that these
factors have little effect on the reasonable observer‘s perceptions.177
III. FOCUSING ON THE REASONABLE OBSERVER AND LIMITING THE
GOVERNMENT-SPEECH DEFENSE
Although the Supreme Court has long established strong free-speech
protections,178 an abuse of the government-speech doctrine could have
serious ramifications for both private speech rights and government
accountability.179 With this in mind, courts should strictly limit the
application of the government-speech defense to situations in which the
government has a substantial interest in ensuring that messages reasonably
attributed to it are not distorted by private speakers.180 This means, first,
that any test designed to determine whether speech is governmental or
private should focus on the reasonable observer of the speech.181 Second, if
it is determined that a reasonable observer is likely to view a specific
message as government speech, courts should conduct an additional twopart inquiry in order to ensure that the government-speech defense is only
applied in situations where it is absolutely necessary.182 This two-part
176. See, e.g., Stanton, 515 F.3d at 964–68 (applying the four-factor test without
focusing on the reasonable-observer of the specialty plate); Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc.
v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 792–94 (4th Cir. 2004) (same); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.,
305 F.3d at 243–44 (same).
177. See infra notes 193–196 and accompanying text (recognizing that reasonable
observers are unlikely to be aware of non-transparent factors and such factors are unlikely to
influence their perceptions of a message‘s source).
178. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (―From 1791 to
the present [we have] . . . permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited
areas . . . .‖ (emphasis added)); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938)
(―Freedom of speech . . . [is] among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action.‖(emphasis added));
accord Mary Jean Dolan, Why Monuments Are Government Speech: The Hard Case of
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 7, 46 (2008) (―[F]or the most part the
pride of the First Amendment is its protection of even the most offensive speech.‖).
179. Supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text (discussing the dangers of extensive
government speech powers); accord Bezanson & Buss, supra note 5, at 1381 (―[An
expanding] use of speech by government . . . presents heightened risks that the government
may displace or monopolize private speech by inserting its voice in the speech marketplace
[or] employing devices to conceal hidden government messages in private speech . . . .‖);
Bell, supra note 140, at 1280 (―[E]xpanding the government speech doctrine may chill
private citizens‘ free speech rights.‖).
180. See infra Parts III.A–B (explaining that adopting a reasonable-observer and
balance-of-interest test would protect private speech rights and guarantee that the
government is held accountable for its own speech).
181. See infra Part II.A (defining the reasonable-observer test).
182. See infra Part II.B (discussing the balance-of-interest and less-inclusive-means
inquiries and why they are necessary safeguards to protect free speech rights).
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inquiry would require courts to balance the government and private
interests involved, and determine whether there is a less intrusive means of
protecting the government‘s speech interests.183 Under this inquiry, courts
should permit a government-speech defense if: the speech is reasonably
attributable to the government; the government‘s interest is substantial; and
there is no less intrusive means of protecting this interest.
A. The Reasonable-Observer Test
While Justice O‘Connor recognized that the important inquiry in
Establishment Clause analysis was whether a government practice
had the effect of communicating a message of endorsement or disapproval
of religion,184 the important inquiry in government-speech analysis is
whether a communicated message was effectively perceived as
governmental in origin.185 These inquiries are similar in that both ―require
courts to evaluate onlookers‘ perceptions of a message‘s source.‖186 Thus,
as Justice Souter recently recognized in Summum,187 the Establishment
Clause endorsement test should be instructive when determining whether
contested speech is governmental or private.188 This means that, in order to
capture the ―important inquiry‖ of the government-speech doctrine, courts
should ask the following question: Under the totality of the circumstances,
would a reasonable observer view the message as that of the government or
of a private individual or entity?189
183. See infra note 225 and accompanying text (noting that speech may be regulated
only in limited circumstances where it is necessary to preserve a compelling government
interest and then must be regulated by the least restrictive means).
184. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (recognizing that if a government
practice does communicate endorsement or disapproval it solidifies religion‘s relevancy to
status within the political community).
185. See Jacobs, supra note 4, at 109 (―The primary question . . . is whether [the
Government] sent an identifiable message . . . .‖); Norton, supra note 11, at 29 (―[I]f the
expression is to be characterized as government speech exempt from First Amendment
scrutiny, the expression should be delivered in a way that allows the public to understand it
as their government‘s.‖).
186. Norton, supra note 6, at 604 (arguing that analysis of a message‘s source can be
guided by cues or triggers such as communication of a position through government press
conferences or press statements).
187. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
188. See Pleasant City Grove v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1141–42 (2009) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (―This reasonable observer test for governmental character is
of a piece with the one for spotting forbidden governmental endorsement of
religion . . . .); see also Norton, supra note 6, at 606 (―The Supreme Court‘s Establishment
Clause inquiry provides a helpful parallel to the public‘s assessment of a message‘s origin as
governmental or private.‖).
189. Supra notes 106, 172; accord Garry, supra note 67, at 279–80 (―For [governmentspeech] accountability to exist, there must be transparency regarding the source of the
speech—that is, citizens must be aware that the government is the entity responsible for the
speech.‖); Jacobs, supra note 4, at 61 (―The [Supreme] Court‘s treatment of
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Although Justice Souter contemplated a ―reasonable and fully informed
observer,‖190 it should not be presumed that the audience of any particular
form of speech knows every facet of the program that supports or
disseminates the message.191 The reasonable-observer test, therefore,
should be content-specific like the endorsement test,192 but should preclude
any information that is not readily available to the public.193 The reason for
omitting information unavailable to the public is because such
programmatic factors as ―editorial control‖ and ―central purpose‖ will have
little effect on how a reasonable observer perceives a particular message if
they are not made known to that observer.194 For instance, the fact that the
Beef Act promotional program in Johanns was administered as part of a
wider government campaign would not be of great importance in a
reasonable-observer test if the government did not openly acknowledge that
it was responsible for the program.195 Similarly, the government‘s
―purpose‖ of discouraging abortion in Rust would not have much relevance
in a reasonable-observer analysis if patients were not informed about the
government‘s policy.196 Thus, the reasonable observer is not omniscient,
but is aware of the reasonably ascertainable information in the contestedspeech context.
Focusing the government-speech analysis on the perspective of the
reasonable observer would properly address the twin concerns that are not
adequately dealt with by the current speech tests: safeguarding free speech

government/private speech interactions indicates a concern with listeners‘ reasonable
perceptions of the source of the speech they receive.‖).
190. Summum, 120 S. Ct. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
191. See ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289, 302
(6th Cir. 2001) (―Although the reasonable observer is ‗deemed aware of the history and
context of the community and forum in which the religious display appears,‘ such an
observer is not to be deemed omniscient.‖ (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd.
v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O‘Connor, J., concurring))).
192. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 606
(1989) (recognizing that the endorsement test ―examines the particular contexts in which the
government employs religious symbols‖); id. at 629 (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (noting that
―the endorsement test depends on a sensitivity to the unique circumstances and context of a
particular challenged practice‖).
193. See infra notes 194–196 and accompanying text (explaining why non-transparent
information is irrelevant to the reasonable-observer test).
194. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass‘n, 544 U.S. 550, 578 (2005) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (―It means nothing that Government officials control the message if that fact is
never required to be made apparent to those who get the message . . . .‖).
195. See id. at 575–78 (recognizing the importance of programmatic transparency in
government speech). But see supra notes 141–145 and accompanying text (discussing the
problems with the majority‘s opinion in Johanns).
196. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 211 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the government‘s anti-abortion regulations ―manipulat[ed] the content of the doctorpatient dialogue‖).
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rights and ensuring government accountability.197 First, private speech
rights are sure to enjoy greater protection if the government-speech defense
is limited to situations in which it is necessary to protect the government‘s
voice from misattribution.198 Better safeguards would exist under a
reasonable-observer standard because the government must establish that
the contested speech was attributable to the government at the time it was
disseminated.199 Thus, a reasonable-observer standard would effectively
prevent ―after-the-fact manufacture of a government speech defense as an
opportunistic reaction to thwart those challenging government‘s regulation
of what is in fact private speech.‖200 In short, such a standard would reduce
the government‘s ability to control private expressions by simply claiming
the expressions were governmental in nature.
Second, establishing a reasonable-observer standard of analysis would
also promote greater accountability by encouraging the government to
clarify messages it intends to have attributed to it and disclaim private
speech that might be wrongly attributed to it. If the Supreme Court were to
adopt a reasonable-observer test, the government would be on notice that
programs designed to disseminate its own views will not be protected by
the government-speech defense if these views are not reasonably attributed
to the government.201 This would mean that the government could be
forced to fund or provide support for views it does not agree with. A
prudent government entity, then, would implement programs that
effectively attribute messages to the government that it wants to be
associated with.202 This would also provide an effective safeguard against
197. See supra Parts II.A–B (arguing that the current government-speech tests do not
adequately address these concerns).
198. See generally Helen Norton, Not For Attribution: Government’s Interest in
Protecting the Integrity of Its Own Expression, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1317, 1333 (2004)
(arguing that a government entity attempting to protect its expressive interests should be
required to show that the views of private individuals are reasonably being misattributed to
the government); see also Bell, supra note 140, 1301–02 (―A test which includes the
attribution factor and weighs it more heavily would be a step in the right direction.‖).
199. See supra notes 189, 195 (emphasizing the importance of transparency as to the
source of speech in determining whether speech is attributable to the government or a
private individual).
200. Norton, supra note 11, at 27 (advocating the use of the government-speech defense
only when it can be established that the government claimed the speech as its own and that
the speech was understood to be the government‘s at the time of its release).
201. See supra note 189 (acknowledging that any test concerned with government
accountability requires transparency).
202. See Norton, supra note 11, at 27 (―[R]equiring that government identify itself as the
source of a message at the time of its creation forces government to articulate, and thus
think carefully about, its expressive decisions.‖). For example, in a case such as Rust, where
the government did not want to fund doctors who counseled patients on abortions, a
provision requiring doctors to inform each patient that the government forbids them from
providing such advice might have effectively attributed the doctor‘s advice to the
government. Id. at 29–30.
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deceptive government speech by preventing the government from escaping
accountability.203
While the reasonable-observer test is applicable outside of the specialty
license plate context (as will be discussed later), this tangible expression of
speech provides the best example of the effectiveness of the reasonableobserver analysis. Applying the reasonable-observer standard to specialty
license plates, courts should conclude that specialty plates are private
speech. First, if Wooley indicates that standardized messages on license
plates implicate private speech interests,204 then a reasonable observer is
likely to see an even stronger association between the driver of a vehicle
and the content of a specialty license plate.205 A stronger association
between the driver and the content of the license plate is likely because
specialty plates require a vehicle owner to take the affirmative, voluntary
action of paying a fee for a plate with a specific message and design.206
Consequently, if the passive acceptance of a standardized state motto on a
license plate implicates private speech interests, then surely the voluntary
and affirmative steps taken to place a specialty plate on one‘s car are even
more indicative of private speech.
Despite the lessons of Wooley, states have argued that because
legislatures implement specialty plate programs and usually approve of a
plate‘s content, observers of the specialty plates would reasonably assume
that the government has endorsed the organizations and messages
associated with the plates.207 Furthermore, there is a strong argument that,
since states manufacture and maintain ownership over all license plates, a
reasonable observer is likely to conclude that all messages on these statecreated and state-owned plates are at least partially governmental in
nature.208
And even the Wooley Court explicitly recognized that
203. See id. at 30 (―Expressly signaling the message‘s governmental origins [in Rust]
would have permitted listeners to evaluate its quality more accurately, as well as to engage
in political accountability measures if they thought it appropriate to do so.‖).
204. See supra note 29–31 and accompanying text (arguing that license plates should be
considered private speech because of the connection of any message on the plate to the
owner of the vehicle).
205. See Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794 (4th Cir. 2004)
(―This association is much stronger when the vehicle owner displays a specialty license
plate.‖).
206. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (recognizing that a reasonable observer
would likely recognize that the vehicle owner took the initiative in purchasing a specialty
plate, and thus is communicating a personal message).
207. See, e.g., Rose, 361 F.3d at 794–95 (acknowledging that the state had argued that
the ―Choose Life‖ specialty plate statute was the ―most visible expression‖ of its ―clear and
oft-repeated preference for childbirth over abortion‖).
208. See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm‘r of the Va. Dep‘t of Motor
Vehicles, 305 F.3d 241, 251 (4th Cir. 2002) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting from denial of reh‘g
en banc) (―I respectfully submit that it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the [state],
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standardized license plate messages are generally perceived as government
speech when it held that private individuals had a First Amendment right to
dissociate from such speech.209 Yet, the wide variety of specialty plates
that are currently on the road would suggest, to a reasonable observer, that
the state is probably not endorsing every individual specialty plate
message.210 An observer who is aware of the diversity of license plate
messages will likely assume that the state has created a limited forum for
private expression.211 Thus, it is unlikely that a legislature‘s association
with most specialty plate programs is significant enough to outweigh the
private speech interests in the eyes of the reasonable observer.212
Finally, while it may seem that the reasonable-observer test described
above is only applicable in situations where there are concrete physical
expressions of speech (such as license plates or monuments), this test
should apply to all modes of expression where there may be a conflict
between government and private speech interests. This includes the more
abstract expressions found in the rules and regulations of governmentfunded programs.213
For example, the workability of the reasonable-observer test in the
government-funded program context is evident when such an analysis is
applied to the abortion restrictions in Rust.214 In order for these restrictions
to be classified as government speech under a reasonable-observer analysis,
it must be reasonably apparent to the Title X patients that the government
strictly prohibits participating physicians from providing advice related to
abortion and that the government ―does not consider abortion to be an

by manufacturing license plates, placing its name at the top of those plates, and retaining
ownership of them, is the speaker of any message contained on those plates . . . .‖).
209. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text (recognizing that the state‘s interest
in communicating an ideology cannot outweigh an individual‘s First Amendment right to
avoid being tied to such a message).
210. See Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 868 (8th Cir. 2009) (―With more than 200
specialty plates available to Missouri vehicle owners, a reasonable observer could not think
that the State of Missouri communicates all of those messages.‖).
211. See id. (―[T]he wide variety of available specialty plates further suggests that the
messages on specialty plates communicate private speech.‖); Rose, 361 F.3d at 798–99
(observing that ―the array of specialty license plates available in South Carolina‖ suggests
that the public is more likely to associate the content of specialty plates with the vehicle‘s
driver than with the state).
212. See supra notes 204–211 and accompanying text (discussing why the reasonable
observer would associate specialty license plate messages with a vehicle‘s owner and not
the government). But see Corbin, supra note 2, at 646 (―A reasonable person is unlikely to
attribute the message displayed on specialty license plates solely to private speakers or
solely to the government.‖).
213. See infra notes 214–221 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the
reasonable-observer test to determine whether anti-abortion counseling and attorney-client
advice constitute government speech).
214. See supra note 34 (describing the challenged regulations in Rust).
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appropriate method of family planning.‖215 Yet, as the dissent recognized,
Title X participants are not required to inform their patients that the
abortion regulations are government-mandated and the regulations do not
necessarily represent the physician‘s unbiased medical opinion.216 And
while researching and investigating the Title X rules and regulations may
reveal the government as the source of the abortion restrictions, it is
unreasonable to expect the recipients of Title X services to conduct such
extraordinary measures because ―[a] woman seeking the services of a Title
X clinic has every reason to expect, as do we all, that her physician will not
withhold relevant information regarding the very purpose of her visit.‖217
Thus, under the reasonable-observer test, the government mandated
abortion restrictions in Rust would not have withstood the First
Amendment challenges.
Applying the reasonable-observer test to the program restrictions in
Velazquez also demonstrates the effectiveness of this test outside the
license plate context. As the Velazquez majority noted, the purpose of the
LSC program was to allow attorneys to represent the interests of indigent
clients.218 This means ―[t]he lawyer is not the government‘s speaker‖ but
rather
―speaks
on
the
behalf
of
his
or
her
private, indigent client.‖219 Thus, the reasonable observer of the LSC
litigation would conclude that any message delivered by the LSC attorneys
was delivered on behalf of their clients, and was therefore private speech.220
If the regulations prohibiting LSC attorneys from challenging denials of
welfare benefits were upheld, the reasonable observer would likely
conclude that ―[t]he attorney[s] defending the decision to deny benefits‖
were speaking on behalf of their clients, when in fact they were
―deliver[ing]
the
government‘s
message
in

215. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 209 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Title X regulations are view-point based and suppress speech relating to abortion
services).
216. See id. (―If a client asks directly about abortion, a Title X physician or counselor is
required to say, in essence, that the project does not consider abortion to be an appropriate
method of family planning.‖ (emphasis added)). But see id. at 200 (majority opinion)
(―Nothing in [the Title X program regulations] requires a doctor to represent as his own any
opinion that he does not in fact hold.‖).
217. Id. at 211–12 n.3. The Title X program regulations thus place a heavy burden on
the doctor-patient relationship and create a disadvantage for the many patients who lack the
resources to seek healthcare from multiple providers. Id.
218. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (recognizing that an attorney‘s advice to
his client does not constitute government speech).
219. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001).
220. See id. at 542–43 (―The advice from the attorney to the client and the advocacy by
the attorney to the courts cannot be classified as governmental speech even under a generous
understanding of the concept.‖).
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the litigation.‖221 Therefore, under the reasonable-observer test, the
regulations in Velazquez were properly struck down on First Amendment
grounds.
The applicability of the reasonable-observer test to the program
restrictions in Rust and Velazquez demonstrates the general applicability of
a government-speech test that focuses on the audience of a particular
message. Although the modes of expression will not always be as apparent
as when a message or motto is written on a license plate,222 nearly all
modes of expression have an audience that will objectively determine the
message‘s source. It is this objective determination—based on the specific
context and factors of each mode of expression—that should be used to
decide whether contested speech is governmental or private.
B. Other Safeguards Against Abuse of the Government-Speech Defense
Adopting a government-speech test that focuses on the reasonable
observer should bring coherency and accountability to the governmentspeech doctrine,223 but there are additional steps that courts should take to
limit the scope of the government-speech defense.224 After a court
determines that a certain message is likely to be seen as government
speech, and before it allows the government to invoke the heavy-handed
government-speech defense to regulate private speech, it should ask two
additional questions: (1) is there a substantial government-speech interest
outweighing the private speech rights that may be encumbered; and (2) is
there a less intrusive and reasonably feasible means of ensuring the
message is properly attributed to the rightful speaker?225 These factors

221. Id. at 542.
222. Compare Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716–17 (1977) (recognizing a clear
attempt by New Hampshire to communicate a message by placing its state motto on license
plates), with Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1990) (recognizing the government‘s
expressive interests in choosing ―to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other‖).
223. See supra Part III.A (arguing that a reasonable-observer standard would reduce the
government‘s ability to censor private expression and encourage governmental clarification
of messages that be may attributed to it).
224. See Jacobs, supra note 4, at 42 (―The reason for such limited governmental
discretion to discriminate among private speakers is the fear that underpins the First
Amendment of government censorship in the private speech market.‖).
225. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm‘t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (―If
a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling Government interest. If a less restrictive alternative would serve the
Government‘s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.‖); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 155 (1973) (―Where certain ‗fundamental rights‘ are involved, the Court has held that
regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a ‗compelling state interest,‘ and
that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state
interests at stake.‖).
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should be employed to find a practical balance between the governmental
and private interests involved in the specific speech context in question.
1.

Is there a substantial government speech interest that outweighs the
private speech rights that may be burdened?
Recognizing that the government-speech defense restricts speech that
would otherwise enjoy strong First Amendment protection,226 courts should
only allow the government to invoke the defense if its interests are
substantial. It might be suggested that such an inquiry is unnecessary
because the very fact that the government is seeking to control a message
by invoking the government-speech doctrine would suggest that its
interests are substantial; however, this inquiry should not turn on a
subjective claim by the government, but rather on an objective
determination of whether the government‘s interest outweighs the private
speech interests at stake.227 This balancing test should incorporate a
multitude of relevant factors, including whether there are alternative and
reasonable means of expression for the private parties whose speech
interests are involved.228
Using the specialty license plates as an example, assume for the sake of
this hypothetical exercise that these plates are reasonably seen as
government speech, or at least a government endorsement of a private
message. A court should then ask whether the government‘s interest in
disassociating itself with the content of a specific specialty plate outweighs
the private interest of the vehicle‘s driver in associating with the plate‘s
message. The outcome of this inquiry would depend on the content of the
plate, as the government‘s interest in not being associated with the
controversial issue of abortion would be far greater than its interest in not
being associated with a particular sport or recreational activity.229
Additionally, a court might conclude that the state does not unduly burden
a private party‘s speech interests when it refuses to issue specialty plates
that convey a particular viewpoint because of the availability of alternative
226. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text (describing the government-speech
defense as an exception to Free Speech Clause limitations).
227. Cf. BARNETT, supra note 150, at 261 (―[T]he bare assertion that legislation
abridging freedom of speech serves a legitimate legislative end is also insufficient. When
the First Amendment is implicated we maintain a healthy skepticism of legislative
motivations.‖).
228. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (―[Government]
restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech [must] leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.‖).
229. Compare Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 866 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding
that the State of Illinois has a legitimate interest in remaining neutral on the subject of
abortion), with Kulwinski, supra note 3, at 1319 (noting that ―many specialty license plates
simply promote local sports teams‖).
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means of expression, such as bumper stickers that endorse the excluded
viewpoint.230 The strength of the government‘s interest and the burden on
private interests should be weighed against one another to determine if the
government‘s speech interest is substantial.
2. Is there a less intrusive, reasonable, and feasible means of ensuring
the message is properly attributed to the rightful speaker?
Even if the government‘s interest is substantial, the inquiry should not
end there. The Supreme Court has consistently held that ―even though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when
the end can be more narrowly achieved.‖231 If, then, there is a reasonable
and less intrusive means by which to achieve the government‘s objective of
protecting its expressive interest, a court should preclude the government
from using the government-speech defense.232

230. Cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 722 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that compelling individuals to display a state motto on their license plate does not
unduly burden their speech interests because they could place ―a conspicuous bumper
sticker explaining in no uncertain terms that they . . . violently disagree with the
connotations of that motto‖). It is important to note that this is just a hypothetical exercise
that assumes specialty plates are reasonably viewed as strongly implicating government
speech, which makes the ―availability of alternative means of expression‖ argument
relevant. This argument, rejected by the majority in Wooley in the context of compelled
speech, also carries little weight when dealing with the voluntary speech involved in
specialty license plates. See id. at 716. The reason is that there are at least two significant
distinctions between a vehicle owner‘s association with messages on specialty plates and his
or her association with messages on bumper stickers. First, the process of acquiring a
specialty plate is likely much more burdensome and expensive than purchasing and placing
a bumper sticker on one‘s vehicle. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (recognizing
that vehicle owners must apply for and purchase specialty plates). This additional trouble
and expense involved in expressing oneself through a specialty plate could reasonably
suggest a stronger connection toward the speech on the plate. Supra notes 205–206 and
accompanying text. The second point closely mirrors the first: the fact that most specialty
license plate programs allow for a portion of the program‘s fees to go towards supporting
certain organizations also suggests a stronger connection between a vehicle owner and the
message that the organization hopes to disseminate. See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v.
Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 2008) (―Arizona[‗s specialty plate program] provid[es]
a forum in which philanthropic organizations can exercise their First Amendment rights in
the hopes of raising money to support their cause.‖); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v.
Comm‘r of the Va. Dep‘t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 620 (4th Cir. 2002)
(―[M]otorists who have them send a personal message by carrying [specialty] plates on their
vehicles, because the plates identify them as members of the organization.‖). Thus, the very
act of acquiring a specialty license plate, with the additional costs and effort that goes into
adopting an organization‘s message, is itself a unique, intimate and expressive speech act by
the individual who has consciously purchased the specialty plate.
231. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
232. See supra note 225 (stating that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn so
as to preserve speech rights); see also BARNETT, supra note 150, at 340 (―A particular
restriction on liberty is unnecessary if there is some other means of accomplishing the
proper purpose that is less restrictive or does not restrict liberty at all.‖).
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In the context of misattribution of speech, one alternative means of
ensuring that a specific viewpoint is correctly associated with the right
party is to issue a disclaimer or a statement accepting responsibility for a
specific message.233 It is not always necessary or feasible, however, for a
government to explicitly notify the public what is and is not its own
message.234 For example, the Summum Court found a formal resolution
publicly embracing the messages conveyed by the Pioneer Park monuments
to be unnecessary because the City‘s actions—that is, taking ownership of
the monuments and permanently displaying them on public property—
―provided a more dramatic form of adoption.‖235 In the specialty plate
context, it has been argued that the content of license plates leave no room
for a disclaimer;236 therefore, it would be unreasonable to require a state to
place one on its specialty plates.
Nevertheless, there are situations in which a simple disclaimer could
provide the audience of certain speech with sufficient notice that the speech
is governmental or private. Take, for example, a government promotional
campaign like the one implemented in Johanns.237 By including a
reasonably visible disclaimer acknowledging that the beef promotions were
part of a government authorized program and did not necessarily represent
the views of all of America‘s beef producers, the government might have
effectively attributed the promotional messages to itself.238 As the dissent
233. See generally Bezanson & Buss, supra note 5, at 1485 (―[B]ecause the
government‘s capacity for communicating its position is extensive, it is better to rely on the
government‘s access to the marketplace of ideas than to permit the government to curtail the
marketplace.‖); Norton, supra note 198, at 1339 (discussing factors to consider when
determining when the government may protect its own expression and arguing that ―[i]f
government can adequately protect the integrity of its expression by disclaiming private
speech, then it should do so‖).
234. See Pleasant City Grove v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009) (rejecting
Summum‘s argument that the government should be required ―to go through a formal
process of adopting a resolution publicly embracing ‗the message‘‖ that privately donated
monuments convey and noting that imposing such a requirement across every jurisdiction in
the country ―would be a pointless exercise that the Constitution does not mandate‖); Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 794 n.2 (1995) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (concluding that a disclaimer may not always be effective when other factors
―outweigh the mitigating effect of the disclaimer‖); see also Norton, supra note 198, 1339–
40 (recognizing that ―[d]isclaimers . . . are ineffective in some circumstances‖).
235. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134.
236. See Norton, supra note 198, at 1339–40 (―License plates, for example, offer no
space in which a state may disavow or rebut personalized or specialty messages.‖).
237. See supra Part I.A (discussing Johanns).
238. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass‘n, 544 U.S. 550, 578 (2005) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (observing that it is difficult to understand how anyone would view the beef
promotional ads as coming from the government ―unless the message[s] came out and said
so‖). In fact, the petitioners in Johanns actually argued that the government did just this
when it included a red checkmark with the word ―beef‖ above it in the beef ads, ―because
this ‗distinctive checkoff logo is a direct sign that the ads are disseminated pursuant to the
federal checkoff program.‘‖ Id. at 577 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent found this
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inferred, this would better ensure that the government was held accountable
for the content of its promotional ads.239 Thus, if there is a reasonable and
less intrusive means of protecting the government‘s expressive interests,
such as expressly claiming or disclaiming a particular message, it should be
pursued before employing the government-speech defense to quiet a First
Amendment challenge.
CONCLUSION
While the government-speech doctrine was formulated as a means of
protecting the government‘s ability to send, maintain, and clarify its own
message, its misapplication and an unnecessary expansion of that
misapplication pose a serious threat to free speech protections and political
accountability. The dangers of the current government-speech tests used
by the circuits are that they provide ample opportunity for the government
or courts to silence disfavored viewpoints in the name of protecting the
government‘s voice, and that they do not ensure the electoral accountability
that is at the heart of the government-speech doctrine. The Johanns test‘s
focus on editorial control does little to guarantee that audience perception is
taken into account, precluding any meaningful accountability if a
government program is designed in such a way as to conceal the
government‘s role in the program. Furthermore, the relationship between
the four-factor test and the distinction between government speech and
private speech is unclear. As its application has shown, an analysis of the
four factors does not necessarily focus on the reasonable observer of a
particular message. Because electoral accountability of government
expression is only possible if the public can distinguish governmental
viewpoints from private viewpoints, focusing on the reasonable observer of
speech should be a necessary requisite of any useful government-speech
test.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court should step in and establish a
uniform test that focuses on the reasonable observer of contested speech.
Additionally, the Court should limit the application of the governmentspeech defense through both a balance-of-interests and less-intrusivemeans analysis once it has determined that a reasonable observer is likely
to see a specific message as governmental. These additional inquiries will
argument to be unconvincing, given that most Americans were unlikely to understand the
significance of the red checkmark. Id. (―It seems to me quite implausible that most (or even
some) Americans associate a red checkmark underneath the word ‗beef‘ with the Federal
Government.‖).
239. See id. at 577 (finding that by avoiding the disclaimer the government has masked
its role in producing the ads).
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ensure that the government-speech defense is limited solely to situations
where the government‘s expressive interest is so substantial that it
outweighs the opposing private speech interests, and to situations where
there is no less intrusive means, such as a disclaimer, that would protect the
government‘s interest.
Besides providing a uniform analysis to determine what is government
speech, the approach proposed in this Comment would strictly limit the
application of the ―government speech‖ label to speech that is readily
identifiable as the government‘s and to situations where it is absolutely
necessary to protect the government‘s expressive interest. This would
reduce the possibility of potential First Amendment harms that are sure to
result from an expansive government-speech doctrine. Furthermore, the
approach proposed in this Comment would encourage greater transparency
in government programs designed to disseminate the government‘s own
message and would encourage the government to speak more clearly when
expressing itself to the public. Ultimately, a clear government voice only
furthers the deliberative discourse necessary for an effective democratic
republic, and remedies the dangers of misattribution through what Justice
Brandeis called the ―command of the Constitution‖: more speech, not less.

